


MAPPING BOKO HARAM AND ISWA INFLUENCE IN CAMEROON

30TH AUGUST 2019 - FINAL REPORT

The Consortium: CMC / ELVA / CERASS
Produced for: USAID/OTI / Creative Associates in Cameroon

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Acronyms:


BH	-	Boko Haram
CERASS	-	Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Appliquées en Sciences Sociales
CMC	-	Conflict Management Consulting
HHS	-	Household Survey
IDP	-	Internally displaced person
ISWA	-	Islamic State West Africa
ISWAP	-	Islamic State West African Province
JAS	-	Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad
KI	-	Key informant
KII	-	Key-informant Interview
OTI	-	Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID)
PSU	-	Primary sampling unit
R0	-	Round 0
R1	-	Round 1
R2	-	Round 2
R3	-	Round 3
VEO	-	Violent extremist organization

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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This assignment has sought to map the influence of Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) in the region of the Far North of Cameroon (*Extrême-Nord* in French). In doing so, it has conducted three rounds of data gathering using local enumerators covering the period from October 2018 to May 2019, achieving a total of 4000 responses to a house-hold survey and 900 key informant interviews, distributed across 100 villages in the departments of Logone et Chari, Mayo Tsanaga, Mayo Sava and Diamaré (only Pette Arrondissement).

Figure 1: Mapped area showing perceived degrees of influence



The main conclusion is that violent extremist organization (VEO) activity in the mapped areas is best described as pursuing a **VEO resource extraction strategy**. The patterns and methods of VEOs currently active in the area seek primarily to use the mapped area as a zone from which to extract

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resources from communities such as cattle, cash, food, grain and other produce and material items, and to a limited extent, the recruitment of new members.

The data suggests that although the resource extraction aim is stable, **the methods used by insurgents to extract resources differ** mainly in terms of how much direct violence is applied in the resource extraction process. Reported methods used by VEOs to extract resources from communities range from violent raids and attacks, often associated with looting, rape and killing of villagers, to more modulated forms of interaction aimed are negotiating the terms of resource extraction and finally to the most advanced methods of resource extraction captured by the data, namely, attempts to set up regular and sustainable taxation of communities.

The assumptions underpinning the description of VEO activities in these terms is that **overtly violent methods of resource extraction are costly for VEOs** as they attract the attention of security forces and alienate communities. This is presumably difficult for VEOs to sustain. For this reason, it may be suggested that VEO strategy in the mapped area closest to Lake Chad seeks to establish consensual relations aimed at regular, non-violent extraction of taxes from communities, where they can. Ultimately, this community consent is based on the threat of VEO violence and could perhaps more accurately be described as community acquiescence. Importantly, these methods of resource extraction do not require the permanent presence of the VEO nor that the VEO has territorial control, although it does necessitate the ability to move and make contact to communities on a regular basis.

By contrast, there is little evidence in the dataset that VEOs in the mapped area are trying to, or have been able to, work towards **building a proto-state or state-like arrangements**, here indicated by the provision of policing and law enforcement, justice and dispute resolution to communities. These kinds of activities entail a higher degree of political ambition, depending upon well-established relationships of trust with communities as well as permanent presence and territorial control.

Interestingly, although the data material abounds with references to “Boko Haram” as the sole and dominant VEO currently active in the mapping area, most respondents simultaneously claim to be unable to differentiate between Boko Haram and ISWA. The report discusses the potential reasons for this contradiction. Amongst other reasons, these include the threat perception amongst respondents that VEOs will punish those who provide information on VEOs to the authorities, as well as the possibility that the difference between ISWA and Boko Haram may be more clear-cut at central, leadership level and in analytical accounts than is the case amongst foot-soldiers at grass-roots level, who may be more motivated by material gain and opportunism.

Based on this overall assessment, the report offers the following 5 **recommendations**. Although the recommendations are presented in a concise form here, in Section 5 below, each recommendation is grounded in the dataset and accompanied by an explanation of the background for the recommendation:

1. **Focus on the link between youth and crime**, as a considerable community concern exists around the threat of the youth being attracted by the lure of quick material gain and involvement with VEOs in the context of low employment opportunities and hopelessness for the future.
2. **Challenge popular perceptions of radicalization** to enable the reintegration of returnees/repentis, who risk being seen by their communities as permanently damaged by their association with VEOs.
3. **Clarify what’s up in Zina Arrondissement**, due to the anomalously high reported levels of bandits and “other” armed groups at the same time as with very low levels of reported VEO presence in this arrondissement.

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4. **Sustain "business as usual"**, by striving to sustain villagers' livelihoods, access to fields, markets and other villages as this is a central community concern across the rounds. More specifically, efforts to counter the insurgency by state authorities and other actors should strive to minimize the disruption of day-to-day community activities. Protecting community livelihoods enhances community resilience and ensures continued community support for measures to counter the insurgency. Additionally, sustaining "business as usual" will help to minimize some of the negative economic dynamics of the insurgency that result from disruptions in the local economy: evidence suggests that restricted transport routes and restricted flows of goods tends to increase the prices of transport and goods, thus benefitting certain transport vendors and certain traders at the expense of others and at the expense of communities. Additionally, the ready availability of goods at natural prices and the availability of several trading opportunities for communities decreases the capacity of VEOs to control economic activity and price levels by ensuring the availability of alternatives.
5. **Further investigate VEO practices in northern Logone et Chari.** The mapping has revealed a clear community willingness to name the active VEO in the mapped area in general. This includes respondents in northern Logone et Chari. However, communities also claim to be unable to differentiate between Boko Haram and ISWA. In the south-western part of the mapped area, in the arrondissements of Mayo Tsanaga and Mayo Sava, this finding does not pose a challenge since various independent sources coincide on identifying the active VEO in this area as being Boko Haram. On the other hand, in northern Logone et Chari, on-going mapping by the Consortium in Nigeria suggests that the active VEO in the area might be ISWA. This poses a challenge because, in this mapping assignment, communities in northern Logone et Chari consistently use the name Boko Haram to designate the active VEO in this area. In other words, there is a chance that communities are misidentifying or mislabeling the VEO in this area. Potential explanations for this are discussed in detail in Section 5 below. Casting further light on this matter is important as it could have a bearing on programming to counter them.

In assisting in the formulation of a geographic targeting strategy for the mapped areas, the report concludes with a **VEO resource extraction model for Cameroon**. Based on the dataset, the model sets up 4 stages of VEO resource extraction, each corresponding to a set of VEO resource extraction activities. Each of the arrondissements from the mapping area are allocated a stage, corresponding to the VEO resource extraction activities encountered in their area during the mapping period. This can be used to formulate a differentiated and targeted programming approach to each of the arrondissements in the mapped area.

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2. INTRODUCTION

In concluding the assignment *Mapping Boko Haram and ISWA influence in Cameroon*, this Final Report does the following four things.

- *Firstly,* the report describes what has been achieved in terms of data collection, which methodological shifts have been made during the project and how the analysis has been undertaken from a methodological point of view. This includes a discussion of the methodological challenges associated with mapping the influence of VEOs in the context of the insurgency in Cameroon and the implications of this for the influence mapping.

- *Secondly,* in presenting a set of findings, the report clarifies the trends revealed by the data and provides a high-level analysis of the development in the perceptions of respondents concerning the major themes of the influence mapping.

- *Thirdly*, the report presents a set of recommendations, aligned with trends and findings included in the foregoing analysis.

- *Finally*, in Annex 1, the report presents a **model to classify different types of VEO resource extraction** in the Far North of Cameroon, which divides VEO resource extraction behavior into 4 categories. These categories are used as a basis for characterizing the stage of maturity of VEO resource extraction in the different parts of the mapping area. This can in turn be used to formulate a geographical targeting strategy.

This Final Report is a supplement to the *Lake Chad Monitor*, contextualizing and complementing the overview presented on the *Lake Chad Monitor*, which covers the same period and geographical areas as covered by this Report.

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3. PROJECT METHODOLOGY: POINT OF DEPARTURE, EVOLUTION AND LIMITATIONS

In this Section, we describe the basic approach used in mapping the influence of VEOs, the actual data-gathering that has been undertaken, which methodological changes have been introduced since the project commenced and how the analysis of the data has been undertaken. The section also comments on the opportunities and limitations of the methods applied.

MAPPING INFLUENCE: HOW HAVE WE DONE IT?

The mandate of the assignment has been to *map the influence* of Boko Haram and ISWA in the Far North of Cameroon based on direct data collection in affected communities. In other words, as our source of data, we have asked the communities themselves about their experiences of the insurgency and its social consequences.

How have we understood *VEO influence* in this assignment?

Firstly, in using respondents residing in affected communities as the source of data, we strictly speaking should refer to the mapping of *community perceptions* of VEO influence rather than VEO influence per say. (See *Methodological imitations* section below)

Secondly, in order to operationalize the concept into implementable data-gathering instruments (KIIs and HHS), the concept of *influence* was disaggregated into a set of themes and topics (See Table 1 below), each enabling one or more questions to be formulated and posed. An additional set of themes were added by USAID during the Point of Departure Workshop in Yaoundé on 23rd– 24th July 2018.

Table 1: Themes and topics in influence mapping, Boko Haram and ISWA, northern Cameroon.

Theme *Topic*	**Rationale for the theme and topic**
Spheres of control and influence	
Identification	Are VEOs present in the area? If so, can respondents identify them? If so, how do they know them?
Differentiation	Can respondents tell the difference between different VEOs? If so, how?
Policing and law enforcement	Do the VEOs provide law and order to communities?
Judiciary	Do the VEOs provide conflict resolution and justice mechanisms to communities?
Economy	Do VEOs have an impact on local livelihoods? If so, how? Are VEOs extracting resources from communities? If so, how? Have there been changes in local resource distribution resulting from the insurgency? What may these be?
Military	What is the armed strength and the capacity for direct physical violence of VEOs?
Human Resources	
Recruitment	Are VEOs recruiting from communities in the mapping area, either by force or by outreach?
Communication channels	To what extent are VEOs using different communication channels in communicating with VEOs?

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Enabling Environment	
Popular support	To what extent is there popular support for the VEOs in communities?
Freedom of Movement	To what extent do the VEOs enjoy freedom of movement in the local areas?
Additional themes	
Stabilization	How are the internal displacement patterns influencing communities?
Reintegration	What do communities see as the challenges and priorities in terms of handling those who have fought for VEOs but have returned to their communities (*repentis*)?
Generational Gap	Is there evidence of a generational gap with potential implications for community cohesion and the disposition of the youth?
VEOs and religious ideology	Is there any evidence of the increasing importance of religion at local level? If so, what is this?
Soft Security	What is the broader security picture at community level, beyond the narrow VEO sense, in terms of various types of crime?

Set up in this way, the combined themes and topics sought to provide a holistic image of popular perceptions of the insurgency and the selected social issues related to the insurgency at a disaggregated social level.

Once collected, the data for each round has been analyzed as follows:

The *quantitative data* was analyzed by disaggregating to Department, Arrondissement and village level, allowing significant trends and variations at decentralized level to emerge. Significant local level trends, variations and points of interest were further pursued by analyzing the qualitative data submitted by respondents.

The *qualitative material* was analyzed according to the rationale of the foregoing questions, seeking to extract the perceptions, concern and priorities of respondents at village level. The main contribution of the qualitative data has been to elaborate and nuance the images that have been provided by the quantitative data.

APPROACH TO FIELD DATA COLLECTION

In order to optimize the quality of the data collected in the field, the following were implemented during the course of the assignment:

USING LOCAL ENUMERATORS

All field data collection was conducted by CERASS, who were responsible for the identification, recruitment, mobilization and management of the team of enumerators used for field data gathering.

CERASS has used enumerators who were:

- Resident in the area of the survey
- Familiar with its communities and local developments
- Able to move unencumbered in the area

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- Able to conduct KIIs and HHS in local languages and capture the answers in good quality, written French on KoboCollect

This has meant that the mobilized enumerator teams were well-suited to understand and operate in their allocated data-gathering areas.

Ensuring prior local permissions (Community Entry)

Prior to data-gathering activities, CERASS enumerators have carefully explained the purpose of the survey, requesting permission to carry it out in the specific location. On the whole, this resulted in a good level of access to villages, an incident in Kolofata in December 2018 notwithstanding. (See E-mail report of 18th December 2018). The fact that the same key informants and villages were used across the three rounds allowed CERASS to inform communities about R2 and R3 during R1, which enabled good community access during R3.

Presenting the survey to respondents

In order to enhance respondent cooperation and allay potential fears associated with the data-gathering, enumerators presented themselves to respondents in villages using a text jointly formulated by The Consortium and by the client at the start of the assignment, as follows.

> *"Good morning/afternoon, my name is ..... I work for CERASS, an independent research organization. I do not represent the government or any of its agencies - we are purely a research institution. We are currently conducting a survey on issues affecting the villages in the region as a whole, and I would like to discuss some of these issues with someone in your household as well as other people in this village. Every person in this village has equal chance of being included in this survey - selection is random. All information and discussion with you will be treated with confidentiality and will not be disclosed to any third party. You will be anonymous so that it cannot be known that it is you that has given these answers. Taking part in this study is completely voluntary and you have the right to end the interview at any stage or refuse to answer any questions you are not comfortable with. However, we hope you will participate, as your views are very important."*

Ensuring an enabling interview environment

In selecting the physical location of interviews at village level, CERASS conducted interviews in settings deemed appropriate by respondents. As a point of departure, during interviews with parents, only children younger than two years were permitted to be present. Similarly, where possible, female KIIs were interviewed by female staff.

Ensuring the consent of local public authorities

Prior to the implementation of each round, CERASS approached the relevant Department and the Arrondissement with a letter of introduction provided by USAID's implementing partner Creative Associates to secure the consent of the local authorities to the data-gathering.

On the difference between KIIs and HHS respondents

In order to include the perspectives of youth and women in the 3 KIs to be interviewed in each village, the aim was to interview 1 community representative, 1 youth representative and 1 women's

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representative in each village. In other words, KIs were purposively chosen on site by the CERASS enumerators.

By contrast, the 20 HHS respondents in each village were randomly selected by CERASS enumerators, using a walking random sampling technique.

As a result of this difference in sampling technique, the perspectives of KIIs cannot be generalized but those of HHS respondents can. In addition, since the same KIs were used across the three rounds, replacements notwithstanding (See *Replacement Rates* below), the KI responses are comparable. The same applies to the HHS responses.

However, following the adopted methodology, in the questionnaires used for KI and HHS respondents respectively, there was a high degree of overlap on questions posed. Specifically, all respondents (KII and HHS respondents) were asked the questions that provided quantitative data. KIs were additionally asked qualitative questions, which elaborated on the answers to the quantitative questions. For example, in R3, out of a total of 39 questions posed to KIs, 28 were also asked to HHS respondents. Phrased differently, KIs were asked 11 qualitative questions which were not posed to HHS respondents.

For this reason, the KIIs provide valuable qualitative insight in their capacity as community representatives. Given the relatively small size of the population of the villages surveyed, there is good reason to have confidence in the responses of KIIs in their capacity as individuals who are "in the know" about what is occurring in their community, on the assumption that their responses reflect actual conditions. (See *Methodological Limitations* below).

Interestingly, KII and HHS responses often delivered near identical percentage responses, as seen in the following example from Question 1 in R3, where respondents were asked to report VEO presence in their area:

Table 2: Comparing KII and HHS % responses to Question 1 (VEO presence) in R3.

VEO Name	% and count	HHS	KII
Boko Haram (Shekau's group)	%	24	25
	count	487	75
ISIS West-Africa (Barnawi's group)	%	0	0
	count	2	0
ISIS West-Africa (Mamman Nur's group)	%	0	0
	count	2	0
Bandits / coupeurs de route	%	5	5
	count	108	16
Other	%	8	11
	count	153	34
None of the above	%	67	65
	count	1341	196
Unknown	%	1	2
	count	22	5
Refuse to answer	%	1	0
	count	11	1
Total	**%**	**100**	**100**
	count	**2000**	**303**

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This similarity of responses between KIs and respondents to the HHS is apparent across several questions. There are three implications which can be drawn:

- *Firstly*, the KIs can cautiously be seen as proxies for the HHS respondents.
- *Secondly*, the data would suggest that comparisons can be made between the data from the KIs and the HHS respondents.
- *Thirdly*, this pattern would tend to enhance the confidence in the validity of the responses given the internal consistency of the image generated by the data.

THE ACHIEVED VOLUME AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE DATA-GATHERING

This assignment collected qualitative and quantitative data over three rounds of data-gathering, according to the methodology laid out in the *Revised Methodology for R1* on the 14th November 2018 as supplemented by the specification of the R1 sample, approved on the 27th November 2018.

The data-gathering itself, implemented by CERASS, occurred in 100 villages in the 4 Departments of Logone et Chari, Mayo Sava and Mayo Tsanaga and Diamaré (only Pette Arrondissement).

The three data-gathering rounds occurred in the periods:

- 12th - 23rd of December 2018, achieving a total of 302 key informant interviews and 2011 responses to the house-hold survey
- 11th - 19th March 2019, achieving a total of 308 key informant interviews (There was no house-hold survey in R2)
- 23rd - 31st May 2019, achieving a total of 303 key informant interviews and 2000 responses to the house-hold survey

In the three rounds, the following volume and distribution of data was achieved:

Table 3: Volume of data-gathering by Round

Round	**R1**	**R2**	**R3**
Survey type	HHS and KII	KII	HHS and KII
No. HSS respondents	2011	-	2000
No. KII respondents	302	308	303
Number of villages	101	100	100
KII per village	3	3	3
HSS per village	20	-	20
Sample size per village	23	3	23

The geographical distribution of the sample of 100 villages was determined by a *purposive sampling technique* at the level of arrondissements, developed during the inception period of the project. This

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constituted a shift away from a *proportional sampling technique* at arrondissement level.[1] However, random sampling was retained *within* arrondissements. The shift was deemed appropriate since the Pilot Round R0 had revealed that a village sample based on population distribution alone would place too much focus on areas where it was anticipated, based on existing knowledge at the time, that VEO activity and influence would be low.


The major consequence of this shift was an increase in the proportion of villages sampled from Logone et Chari, which increased its proportion of the total sample from 0,30 to 0,51. The total sample size of 100 villages remained unchanged.

This resulted in a sample with the distribution of villages by arrondissement shown in Figure 2 on the following page. The distribution showed here remained unchanged across the three rounds.

[1] The dialogue regarding sample adjustment happened by e-mail between 15th – 27th November 2018. The final purposive sample at arrondissement level was received from USAID on 21st November 2018 in a file entitled *Overview of 3 different samples_OTI revisions*. This provided a redistribution of the samples proposed by the Consortium, including a set of reasons provided by USAID for the redistribution.

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Figure 2: Distribution of sample of 100 villages by arrondissement



At the start of the project, during the Point of Departure workshop in Yaoundé on 23rd– 24th July 2018, it was additionally agreed to make the following methodological revisions:

- *Firstly,* the duration of time between rounds was to increase from 1 to 3 months. The rationale was that one round of data-gathering every month would be too frequent to allow significant

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changes at grassroots level to emerge and to be mapped. As a result, the duration of the project was extended from approximately 6 months to approximately a year, allowing for an extended period of influence mapping.

- *Secondly,* an extended influence mapping period meant that it made sense to decrease the number the rounds from 5 rounds to 3 rounds. This allowed the total volume of data-gathering to remain the same within the revised project period rather than extend the implementation period to 18 months.

REPLACEMENT RATES

Due to the dynamic security situation in the mapping area and due to the duration of the project, it was foreseen that replacement of villages and replacement of KIs might be necessary. KIs typically display a 'natural' rate of attrition, compounded in this assignment by the dynamic security situation. Likewise, the sample of villages, which was randomized at arrondissement level, deliberately did not take prior account of village inaccessibility. Both these factors contributed to the potential for the need for replacements.

For this reason, clear procedures were established during the initial stages of the project for how to identify replacements, where necessary.

These were:

- For villages, the method of "most similar in the vicinity".
- For KIs, the method of identifying secondary KIs by CERASS during R0 and R1.

In all cases of replacement, the replacement was performed on site by the CERASS Field Team, who have been fully informed about the specified replacement procedure.

Across the three rounds, the following replacements were noted:

Village replacement: Reasons noted for the replacement of villages included inaccessibility due to security changes, villages being deserted or being inaccessible due to poor road quality in the rainy season. Although some opposition was met during R1 from local authorities in Mayo Sava, who questioned the legitimacy of the mapping exercise (See CERASS Report R1), the local authorities ultimately conceded to the mapping in their area of jurisdiction and as a result, no village replacements were performed on this basis. In all cases where replacement of a village was necessary, the replacement village was located using the "most similar in the vicinity" method. This meant that all replacement villages were found within the same Arrondissement as the replaced village, thereby retaining the overall proportionality of the target sample of 100 villages. Since R2 was conducted telephonically using telephone numbers gathered by CERASS during R1, village replacement was not a methodological concern during R2.

Table 5: Villages replacement rates (number) by Department for R1 and R3 (R2 was telephonic)

Department	R1	R3
Diamaré (Pette)	0	0
Mayo Tsanaga	1	1
Mayo Sava	1	0
Logone et Chari	9	0

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KI replacement: During implementation, there were no accounts of KI unavailability or opposition from KIs *because of refusal to cooperate* with the survey or other forms of obstacles that have prevented data-gathering. In all three rounds, the minimum required number of 300 KIIs were conducted, with primary KIs being replaced by secondary KIs, who had been identified during R1, where necessary. Reasons for KI replacement varied considerably, but it can be noted that in Mayo Sava, where difficulty was experienced with the local authorities providing the requisite approvals (See *CERASS Report R1*), some respondents were initially cautious about cooperating due to the delay in approval by authorities. However, once this approval was achieved, cooperation of KIs was forthcoming. In the case of secondary KIs used as replacements for primary KIs, all had resided in the village where they were interviewed for the three-month period preceding the interview.

Table 6: Percentage (%) KI replacement rates by Department and Round

Department	R1 to R2	R2 to R3
Diamaré (Pette)	0%	0%
Mayo Tsanaga	2%	4%
Mayo Sava	30%	20%
Logone et Chari	22%	17%

ON STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE

From the point of conception, this influence mapping assignment has been a descriptive endeavor which captured and trackd the change on disaggregated influence parameters at village level over the mapping period in a predefined geographical area.

The influence mapping in this sense did not focus on the root causes of the insurgency in northern Cameroon, nor on causal relationships between variables, for example, whether there was a statistically significant link between ethnicity and the insurgency or, for example, between geographical location and the insurgency. For this reason, in pursuing the methodological mandate, no dependent and independent variables were defined at the start and likewise, no hypothesis was formed about the relationship between them. As a result, the methodology applied in this influence mapping assignment has generated an essentially descriptive account, which can assist further programming by providing a solid base of data for making findings and providing recommendations.

An overview of the sample sizes compared to the universe of villages can be seen in the table below. As discussed above, the purposive sampling of villages across departments and the random sampling of villages at arrondissement level was discussed and approved during the Inception Phase.

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Table 7: sample sizes compared to the universe of villages

Department and Arrondissement	Population	Sample size (villages)	Total number of villages in arrondissement
Diamaré	***642.227***	***3***	***132***
Pette	37.125	3	132
Logone et Chari	***486.997***	***51***	***952***
Blangoua	50.398	7	63
Darak	23.901	5	40
Fotokol	36.893	7	80
Goulfey	58.117	4	201
Hile-Alifa	18.425	6	33
Kousseri	101.246	5	59
Logone Birni	52.589	3	242
Zina	25.572	3	88
Makari	104.843	8	87
Waza	15.013	3	59
Mayo Sava	***348.890***	***19***	***636***
Kolofata	77.857	7	245
Mora	179.777	7	297
Tokombere	91.256	5	94
Mayo Tsanaga	***699.971***	***28***	***258***
Bourrha	88.585	3	39
Koza	81.076	4	38
Mayo Moskota	73.716	5	51
Mogode	112.905	7	35
Mokolo	242.274	8	95
Total	**1.572.983**	**101**	**1978**

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The purposive sampling applied at departmental level did not enable the calculation of statistical significance (confidence intervals) for the mapped area as a whole. At the level of arrondissements, the random sampling in principle enabled the calculation of statistical significance (confidence intervals). However, given the varying sample sizes relative to the universe of PSUs in each village, the validity and utility of calculated confidence intervals was questionable. In addition, the context of insecurity that was associated with the insurgency further complicated the calculation of statistical significance by introducing a degree of insecurity into the integrity of the data. (See *Methodological limitations* below.)

INTERNAL QUALITY ASSURANCE

In order to maximize the quality of the data, the following steps were taken:

TRAINING OF CERASS TEAM

Before the data-gathering commenced, the CERASS team was trained by the Consortium on the specific approach to this assignment supplemented with training on lessons learned from the data-gathering in adjacent countries.

QUALITY ASSURANCE OF DATA

In cooperation with CERASS, the quality assurance of the data involved the following steps:

- Enumerators were given an ID number allowing each survey to be attributable to an enumerator
- Each enumerator completed a check of each interview on the tablet and completed any missing information before ending the interview
- CERASS Team supervisors checked all the interviews in the tablets for the coherence and adequacy of answers. If an error or inconsistency was noted, the enumerator was asked to provide further information and to go back to the field (KII or household) to collect the necessary data if required
- The CERASS Team supervisors then uploaded the data
- Once the full dataset had been uploaded, the CERASS head office in Yaoundé performed a final integrity check before the data was approved for analysis

METHODOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS

Given the level of conflict associated with the insurgency in the mapping area in the Far North of Cameroon, and the potential that communities felt at risk by participation in survey activities that could be interpreted by insurgents as collusion with the authorities, there was an inherent risk that respondents would censor and minimize their responses to questions or worse, simply refuse to participate in the survey.[2]

Lacking respondent participation was not a problem during this assignment, with CERASS achieving all its data-gathering targets. However, it was difficult to ascertain with precision whether respondent accounts of VEO presence and activity have been modified by respondents in responding. In principle it is possible that a *social desirability bias* has influenced the responses of respondents. Despite the phrasing of the introduction of the survey to respondents (see above), survey activity in the field was

[2] A good description of the threat perception of villagers caught between the insurgent and the state authorities, albeit from on-going campaigns against jihadists in Mali, may be noted here: https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-mali-security-france-widerimage/french-troops-in-mali-anti-jihadist-campaign-mired-in-mud-and-mistrust-idUKKCN1V304G)

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in all likelihood interpreted by communities as being aligned with national and international actors seeking to combat the insurgency. This positionality might have caused respondents to avoid giving answers which would suggest support or sympathy for the insurgency or responses which would suggest a critique of the national institutions, security forces and their policies. Additionally, fearing potential reprisals from VEOs, this factor might have reduced respondents' willingness to speak at length to data-gatherers. This might also have reduced the amount of concrete detail provided in qualitative responses, including making references to persons, places, methods, events or named groups. Although CERASS has not reported problems with respondents being frightened or restrained, the limited length of some of the qualitative responses meant that the effect of this factor could not be excluded.

Similarly, the use of open-ended qualitative questions in the questionnaire which were deliberately open ended so as not to foreclose potential answers, introduced the risk of speculative responses, that reflect the unstable and erratic nature of rumor and hearsay.

That being said, in mitigating the effect of these factors, the stability of the image generated by the influence mapping across the three rounds did tend to validate responses in terms of the geographical distribution of the presence of VEOs, the methods of VEO resource extraction and the related themes and topics of the insurgency. In other words, the data was internally consistent.

More generally, given the extensive impact of the conflict and insurgency upon communities, the stability of the set of respondents and villages, seen as a data-source, could not be taken for granted. These conditions meant that the image of the insurgency generated by this assignment can contribute to a broader dialogue on the nature of the insurgency in Cameroon with a broad set of differentiated stakeholders, at international, national and local level. We believe such a dialogue can be fruitful, specifically because the methods used here have yielded rich qualitative and quantitative data on local populations' perception of the insurgency and have given a clear picture of the insurgency's impact on local lives. As such, the research can effectively complement other data sources on the insurgency in Cameroon.

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4. WHAT HAVE WE OBSERVED? TRENDS IN THE INSURGENCY IN CAMEROON

In this section, we present the high-level summary of trends in the areas covered by this influence mapping assignment, as they have emerged across the three data-gathering rounds. It is not the intention here to duplicate the detailed analysis which has occurred on a theme-by-theme basis in the three foregoing Situation Reports ("SitReps"), but rather to draw out a coherent image of the insurgency as it appears in the data across the influence mapping period.

THE FAR NORTH OF CAMEROON SERVES AS A 'RESOURCE EXTRACTION ZONE' FOR VEO

It is probably most accurate to describe the influence mapping area in the Far North of Cameroon as a 'resource extraction zone' for VEOs, meaning that the insurgency uses the mapped areas in Cameroon mainly as a source of various kinds of resources including cattle, cash, food, produce and to a limited extent, recruitment.

In varying degrees, and using a combination of violence, coercion and consent, the data would suggest that insurgents, with some degree of stability and success, use the communities in affected areas as sites for replenishing their supplies, stealing cattle and produce and for levying "taxes" on communities and, to a limited extent, use kidnapping either as a source of ransom or for recruitment.

The basis for this 'resource extraction' conclusion, is that the aim of resource extraction seems to be the common denominator across the spectrum of insurgent interactions with communities, as reported by communities. Even though the forms of interaction with communities extends through a broad spectrum (see below), the common drive behind insurgent behavior as shown in respondent's accounts seems to be united by the need for resources.

Several kinds of resource extraction methods are revealed by the data, here presented in decreasing degrees of overt violence necessary for resource extraction to occur:

(These patterns of resource extraction practices by VEOs in the mapped areas are integrated into the **Model for VEO resource extraction**, presented in *Annex 1* below.)

"RAIDS AND KIDNAPPING"

The term "raids" covers attacks on communities by armed groups of VEOs with the aim of theft, in some accounts associated with killing, rape and kidnapping. The aim of raids in this form are often to steal cattle, as the most prominent aim, followed by cash, goods, produce or food. Raids constitute the most overtly violent form of interaction with communities, as summed up by a respondent in Dougoumsilio II village in Hile Alifa:

> *"Boko Haram steal livestock, kill individuals and snatch all their belongings."*

Accounts across mapped areas affected by this form of violence consistently express concern, anger and trauma at the extent of victimization and impact on the community. Many of the attacks occur during the night and many communities feel helpless in the face of the threat, although accounts of community defense committees and help from Cameroonian security forces are also noted. The geographical distribution of raids in this form are closely linked to VEO presence patterns, being especially prevalent in northern Logone et Chari.

Regarding kidnapping, this is an established practice used by VEOs to extract resources as ransom, as described by a respondent in Ouda Bariki village in Bourrha Arrondissement:

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"They (VEO kidnappers, ed.) are armed groups. When I say armed it is not with the tools, the local and traditional weapons but, the real weapons. It is in the night that they come out directly to their target's home. They are intended to take at least one hostage who will bring them the money in return."

The arrondissements of Darak and Hile Alifa in Logone et Chari, of Mogode and Bourrha in Mayo Tsanaga and of Mora and Kolofata in Mayo Sava all report consistent and comparatively high levels of kidnapping for ransom, this increasing in R3 in Mayo Sava. Again, this VEO behavior corresponds well to mapped VEO presence patterns. Additionally, the link between kidnapping and ransom suggests that kidnapping is best conceived as one method in the broader VEO resource extraction strategy.

"NEGOTIATION"

Negotiation, as a method of resource extraction from communities, refers to practices which have suspended direct violence in favor of verbal communication or negotiation about the terms of resource extraction. This can include, for example, dictating artificially low prices for goods, simply demanding the hand-over of supplies, food or cash or attempts are active recruitment of villagers to join the VEOs. In the data, "negotiation" is operationalized as recruitment and communication practices, which includes respondent accounts of negotiated interaction with insurgents. Although there is evidence of the presence of this in all Departments, the reported levels are very low. The area showing this VEO behavior most clearly is northern Logone et Chari.

Note that "negotiation" should not be confused with "taxation", which is viewed as VEO attempts at a much more structured and regularized resource extraction. (See below).

Across the rounds, reports of VEO recruitment attempts are a very marginal phenomenon, for example, being reported in R3 by a maximum of 12% of respondents in Kousseri and a maximum of 4% in another 7 arrondissements (Darak, Goulfey and Hile Alifa in Logone et Chari, Kolofata and Mora in Mayo Sava and Mayo Moskota and Mogode in Mayo Tsanaga), of the total of 20 arrondissements. In the areas where VEO recruitment attempts are noted, the frequency of recruitment attempts is typically between 1 and 3 attempts. Approaches to recruitment cited in the data are that VEOs directly approach young people and attempt to win them over in offering money and in trying to convince them of the value of the VEO cause.

Similarly, the data suggests that communication channels between VEOs and communities are restricted to word of mouth (especially in Darak and Kousseri in Logone et Chari) and mobile phone, and references to WhatsApp and other social media and hard-copy pamphlets, reported in R2, were not validated during R3.

However, given the threat perception of respondents noted above (See *Methodological limitations*), there might be reason to expect that any frequent negotiation, recruitment and communication patterns between VEOs and communities might not be picked up in the data. Community perceptions of the implications of reporting such information might outweigh the interest in providing a comprehensive answer.

"TAXATION"

More structured attempts at extracting resources from communities are shown in the data through reports on two main VEO behaviors, namely taxing of communities by VEOs and the prevention by VEOs of community access to natural resources (fields, fishing sites). These are forms of VEO intervention in village life that are closely linked. When VEOs make community access to natural

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resources conditional on communities paying some form of "tax" to VEOs (cash, food, grain, other materials), a transaction is established. That is, VEOs do not *deny* access to natural resources altogether but, using coercion and the threat of violence, change the terms under which access to natural resources becomes possible for communities. In other words, VEOs forcibly interrupt daily local economic activity, aiming to draw resources from this community activity. The fact that communities depend on daily local economic activities, is what makes the VEO "taxation" possible."

The areas most affected by this phenomenon are Darak (where all villages provide accounts of taxation and resource extraction), Fotokol and Hile Alifa in Logone et Chari, followed by Mayo Moskota and Mokolo Arrondissements in Mayo Tsanaga and then by Mora in Mayo Sava, again reflecting the geographic distribution of the greatest frequency of reports of Boko Haram presence. Given the frequency distribution of taxation reports in these areas, there is evidence in the data to suggest that it is in these areas that VEOs are most advanced in their attempts at establishing sustainable and consensual resource extraction by "taxation".

This suggests that Boko Haram seeks to tax communities based on cooperation, rather than simple, violent resource extraction. By setting conditions of taxation for community economic activities rather than simply destroying economic activity, insurgents seem to be aiming to build a sustainable resource extraction system – if villagers pay their taxes, they are rewarded by being allowed to continue their livelihood activities, allowing Boko insurgents to extract resources in future. Where this exchange proves impossible, resource extraction techniques turn to coercion and simply involve forcibly extracting money and resources, forcibly setting prices at marketplaces, cattle theft etc., as described above.

Given respondent preferences across Rounds and across Departments for consistently using the label "Boko Haram" to refer to the VEO in their area, it is difficult to make a positive identification of which VEO is operational in which area, on the assumption that others then Boko Haram are in fact active. Whilst the south-western arrondissements of Mayo Sava and Mayo Tsanaga are seen as Boko Haram areas by several independent sources, in northern Logone et Chari, the findings are more ambiguous. It can however be noted, that the area in which taxation is reported as being most advanced is also the area in which some sources suggest that the active VEO in fact is ISWA. This is discussed more fully in Recommendation 5.

"Taxation" could thus be viewed as the most advanced method of resource extraction of the methods currently captured in the data. It requires a high degree of interaction with communities, the ability of VEOs to return regularly to villages and a significant degree of consent from communities, albeit under duress and in the face of threats of violence.

A STABLE AND SUCCESSFUL VEO RESOURCE EXTRACTION STRATEGY?

Why is VEO resource extraction described above as showing "some degree of stability and success"?

During the period covered by this mapping assignment, there are no clear signs that the pattern of resource extraction described is expanding beyond the most affected arrondissements, which all are located along or very close to the Nigerian border. The insurgency retains the same overall geographic distribution across the three rounds, being present in the cluster of Arrondissements at the northern extremity of Logone et Chari and the cluster of Arrondissements along the Western border with Nigeria in Mayo Sava and Mayo Tsanaga, despite limited local variations.

Two potential conclusions may be drawn: either insurgents are largely achieving what they set out to achieve in these areas (extracting sufficient resources), and therefore see no immediate interest in expanding beyond them, or insurgents are restrained by Cameroonian security forces and community

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defense committees in their expansion efforts and the current presence patterns define the limit of their current capacity (they wish to extract more resources but are prevented in doing so).

DESPITE VEO RESOURCE EXTRACTION, THERE ARE VERY FEW SIGNS OF 'PROTO-STATE' FORMATION

There are very few signs that the insurgency is attempting to establish permanent territorial control or to build a "proto-state", which would see insurgents providing policing, justice and dispute resolution mechanisms on a potentially enduring basis to communities, as has been reported *vis-a-vis* ISWA in Nigeria ("Facing the Challenge of the Islamic State in West Africa Province". International Crisis Group, 2019) In other words, it would seem that VEO behavior in the mapped areas in Cameroon does not presently show itself as a targeted political campaign aimed at displacing and replacing the Cameroonian state authority in favor of building a VEO political order in Cameroon. Instead, the data suggests that VEO behavior remains limited by the role played by the mapped areas as a zone for extracting resources for insurgents, presumably to fuel the insurgency in Nigeria, which remains the epicenter of the insurgency.

The basis for this conclusion is that evidence of insurgent activities which suggest proto-state formation are extremely limited, as illustrated by the following two areas of VEO activity which would suggest attempts at proto-state formation.

More specifically, these are:

Policing and law enforcement: in terms of proto-state formation, policing and law enforcement is parameter of some importance, because it indicates the dislodging of traditional, religious or public sector mechanisms for ensuring social order. The ability of VEOs to provide policing and law enforcement requires a high degree of regular or permanent physical presence. In addition, it requires well established and legitimate relations of authority between the VEOs and the community. In other words, where VEO policing and law enforcement occurs, it indicates a significant degree of VEO community penetration.

As can be seen in the figures below, across the three Rounds, community reports on this parameter have been consistent across the three rounds. This generates an image of a sparse prevalence of VEO policing and law enforcement. The table below includes only those 5 arrondissements out of a total of 20 arrondissements reporting VEO policing and law enforcement at levels above "rarely" in any of the three rounds:

Table 8: VEO Policing and law enforcement in arrondissements reporting above "rarely", all respondents, all rounds.

		R1					
Logone et Chari		**Never**	**Rarely**	**Sometimes**	**Often**	**Very often**	**Total**
Darak	%	4	22	73	1	0	100
	Count	5	25	84	1	0	115
Kousseri	%	100	0	0	0	0	100
	Count	27	0	0	0	0	27
Mayo Tsanaga							
Mogode	%	85	14	1	0	0	100
	Count	80	13	1	0	0	94
Mayo Sava							
Mora	%	97	1	2	0	0	100

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	Count	102	1	2	0	0	105
Kolofata	%	99	1	0	0	0	100
	Count	159	1	0	0	0	160
		R2					
Logone et Chari		**Never**	**Rarely**	**Sometimes**	**Often**	**Very often**	**Total**
Darak	%	13	73	7	7	0	100
	Count	2	11	1	1	0	15
Kousseri	%	47	53	0	0	0	100
	Count	7	8	0	0	0	15
Mayo Tsanaga							
mogode	%	86	10	0	5	0	100
	Count	18	2	0	1	0	21
Mayo Sava							
mora	%	80	20	0	0	0	100
	Count	20	5	0	0	0	25
kolofata	%	75	21	4	0	0	100
	Count	18	5	1	0	0	24
		R3					
Logone et Chari		**Never**	**Rarely**	**Sometimes**	**Often**	**Very often**	**Total**
Darak	%	46	47	7	0	0	100
	Count	53	54	8	0	0	115
Kousseri	%	59	40	1	0	0	100
	Count	68	46	1	0	0	115
Mayo Tsanaga							
Mogode	%	89	10	1	0	0	100
	Count	138	16	1	0	0	155
Mayo Sava							
Mora	%	54	44	2	0	0	100
	Count	88	71	3	0	0	162
Kolofata	%	52	48	0	0	0	100
	Count	83	78	0	0	0	161

On the related parameter of **VEO dispute resolution**, a similar picture of a limited phenomenon emerges. This is an important parameter for influence mapping because the provision of dispute resolution to communities by VEOs potentially indicates the displacement of already existing dispute resolution mechanisms, be these traditional, religious or public authorities. The capacity to resolve community disputes assumes considerable local legitimacy with the community, based on relationships of mutual recognition and trust. If this is the case, dispute resolution points in the direction of VEOs making inroads into communities and suggests evidence of alternative order formation.

In the able below, which includes only those 6 out of a total of 20 arrondissements which reported VEO dispute resolution at levels above “rarely” in any of the three rounds. As can be seen, the

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percentage of respondents reporting this phenomenon at above "rarely" peaks at 15% in Darak in R1 but is otherwise sustained at single digit figures across the rounds and additionally, shows a slight decrease across affected arrondissements in R3.

Table 9: VEO dispute resolution in arrondissements reporting above "rarely", all respondents, all rounds.

R1							
Logone et Chari		**Never**	**Rarely**	**Sometimes**	**Often**	**Very often**	**Total**
Darak	%	12	73	15	0	0	100
	Count	14	84	17	0	0	115
Hile Alifa	%	62	28	0	2	7	100
	Count	51	23	0	2	6	82
Kousseri	%	0	96	4	0	0	100
	Count	0	26	1	0	0	27
Mayo Tsanaga							
Mayo Moskota	%	94	6	0	0	0	100
	Count	66	4	0	0	0	70
Mayo Sava							
Mora	%	95	5	0	0	0	100
	Count	100	5	0	0	0	105
Kolofata	%	84	16	0	0	0	100
	Count	134	26	0	0	0	160
R2							
Logone et Chari		**Never**	**Rarely**	**Sometimes**	**Often**	**Very often**	**Total**
Darak	%	33	40	13	13	0	100
	Count	5	6	2	2	0	15
Hile Alifa	%	100	0	0	0	0	100
	Count	18	0	0	0	0	18
Kousseri	%	47	53	0	0	0	100
	Count	7	8	0	0	0	15
Mayo Tsanaga							
Mayo Moskota	%	87	13	0	0	0	100
	Count	13	2	0	0	0	15
Mayo Sava							
Mora	%	80	16	0	4	0	100
	Count	20	4	0	1	0	25
Kolofata	%	79	13	8	0	0	100
	Count	19	3	2	0	0	24
R3							
Logone et Chari		**Never**	**Rarely**	**Sometimes**	**Often**	**Very often**	**Total**

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Darak	%	37	54	9	0	0	100
	Count	43	62	10	0	0	115
Hile Alifa	%	12	88	0	0	0	100
	Count	16	123	0	0	0	139
Kousseri	%	54	46	0	0	0	100
	Count	63	54	0	0	0	117
Mayo Tsanaga							
Mayo Moskota	%	65	33	2	0	0	100
	Count	75	38	2	0	0	115
Mayo Sava							
Mora	%	60	39	1	0	0	100
	Count	97	63	2	0	0	162
Kolofata	%	61	39	0	0	0	100
	Count	99	62	0	0	0	161

On the combined assessment of VEO policing and law enforcement and VEO dispute resolution, both of which would indicate developments in the direction of proto-state formation, there are three points to note:

- *Firstly*, there is very close overlap of the arrondissements experiencing these forms of closely related VEO behavior, suggesting that the data is internally consistent
- *Secondly*, these two phenomena are limited in their frequency and are confined to the most affected arrondissements close to the Nigeria border on the western side of the mapping area or at the northern extremity of Logone et Chari, matching well the reported VEO presence patterns captured in the SitReps and on the Lake Chad Monitor.
- *Thirdly,* despite the relative infrequency of reports of these phenomena, they should be treated with due attention given the regularity of relations between VEOs and communities which they suggest

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5. LOOKING AHEAD

In this section, a set of recommendations is presented based on the analysis conducted in the foregoing SitReps. Each recommendation is substantiated with reference to the specific geographic areas and concrete findings in the data.

RECOMMENDATION 1: FOCUS ON THE LINK BETWEEN YOUTH AND CRIME

Programming should continue previous and existing USAID and other donor measures aimed at providing employment, livelihoods and other opportunities (education, apprenticeships, community work etc.) for youth, especially in Kousseri, Mora and Tokombere arrondissements. In these areas, respondents independently report that youth are at risk of becoming involved in crime as a result of lacking opportunities for livelihoods and hopelessness for the future. Also, respondents report that the youth are presently amongst the culprits behind criminal activities, for example, livestock theft. The aim should be to combat the potential for vulnerable youth to become involved in crime by offering a counterpoint to the attraction of "easy money" and the associated risks of potential involvement with VEOs.

Background for the recommendation:

Respondents point to a linkage between youth unemployment and the prevalence in various criminal activities.

This is the case specifically in Logone et Chari, in Kousseri Arrondissement, where 12 out of 33 respondents responding to the question on crime and soft security referred to "the youth", "the unemployed youth", "youth refugees", "youth who cross the river coming from Chad" and "the youth of our village" as the culprits behind soft security incidents. Reasons cited by respondents for youth involvement in soft security incidents included "wanting easy money" and being "unemployed".

Similarly, in Mayo Sava, in Mora Arrondissements, in the village of Divowa, a respondent (1 of 8 out of a total of 105 who answered this question) points to the youth, corroborating similar accounts from other villages in the arrondissement, states:

> *"It (crime, ed.) is the young people of the village who love easy life. They don't want to work. Night and day, as soon as they have the opportunity, they steal goats and sheep to go sell to the butchers and the people who make the meat."*

Similar accounts of moral decline and youth vulnerability are seen in Tokombere Arrondissement, where 22 of the 98 respondents that responded to this line of questioning, drew the link between crime and vulnerable youth, for example saying:

> *"This damage is caused by the indigenous young drunkards, three days ago there was theft of eight goats here in the villages".*

> *"This (crime ed.) is caused by some young people who are sometimes abandoned by their parents, and who do nothing in life."*

> *"It is (crime ed.) young people in the neighborhood who don't want to work and don't want to go to school."*

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RECOMMENDATION 2: CHALLENGE POPULAR PERCEPTIONS OF RADICALIZATION

As a precursor to concrete activities aimed at the reintegration of returnees/*repentis*, efforts should be made towards changing community perceptions of radicalization in general and of returnees/*repentis* more specifically. The aim should be to shift the community perception of returnees/*repentis* away from being someone who is permanently damaged by their time with VEOs to emphasize both the compulsion behind some involvement with VEOs and the reversibility of loyalties previously expressed to VEOs. This will open opportunities for the community reacceptance of those who have spent time with VEOs and as such enable public and community justice programs.

Background for the recommendation:

On the question of reintegration of returnees/*repentis*, the data shows that the fear that returnees will not deradicalize is the top community concern in over half of all Arrondissements. (See *SitRep 3, Reintegration*)

Whilst this shows that some communities are concerned about the extent to which returnees will deradicalize, it also shows that some communities are doubtful about what to make of the fact that returnees have come back, more specifically, whether the returnee authentically has changed their loyalties to the VEO's.

This finding should be held against a concurrent finding regarding community perceptions of the reasons for individual participation with VEOs. Here, the data indicated that communities see duress (non-voluntary, force, compulsion) as a more important factor than conviction as a reason underpinning participation with VEOs. In other words, communities do recognize that not all participation with VEOs is a free choice and there is thus a potential to present the returnee/*repenti* as a victim.

However, the community concern with radicalization also indicates a fear that ideological conviction and radicalization have been a *permanent* consequences of spending time with VEOs, regardless of the initial reasons for getting involved with VEOs. The qualitative data suggests that respondents subscribe to a notion of radicalization which sees returnees as having been "brainwashed" by VEOs and as potentially harboring lingering loyalties to VEOs. Where this is the case, returnees can often represent an imminent threat to the community to which they return. These images of returnees are unaffected by whether the returnees originally joined the VEO by force or by free will.

More specifically, the qualitative data generates a concerning image of an individual who has not deradicalized. According to the qualitative data, these individuals can have been permanently damaged, they hang on to radical opinions and behaviors that can be readily observed or discerned by closer dialogue and they might have residual loyalties that continue to crop up. The ostensible consequences are bad relationships with neighbors and community members, continued agitation or recruitment for the VEOs as well as adopting radical positions on politics or other social issues. Perhaps not surprisingly, with this characterization in mind, few respondents whose communities claim to have had contact with Boko Haram or radicalized individuals claim to have a difficulty with identifying radicalization.

Examples from the qualitative data (See *SitRep3, Reintegration*) include:

- Bad behavior:

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- *"We can't understand him because for his crimes he'll become like a beast" (Eréo village)*

- Political critique:

  - *"Their opinions are different from ours and they don't like the government of Paul Biya" (Gaska Faourou village)*

- Reintegration problems:

  - *"Its hard (for returnees ed.) to leave the group and then live as if nothing has happened" (Bachaka I village)*

- Permanent effects of radicalization:

  - *"These people are already spoiled in their heads" (Fadja Village)*
  - *"Radicalization shows in a wicked person, who kills, who has no feeling, this person is not easy to reintegrate into society, because he has lost the sense of his neighbor." (Balgue 1 village)*

- Endurance of extremist loyalty after returning:

  - *"When a person leaves the extremist group and decides to reintegrate, he defends more the causes of extremists, because if someone still supports their ideology, he still has the hardening of opinion." (Kaffi II)*

- Other signs of radicalization:

  - *"To find out if someone is becoming radicalized or not, you just have to socialize and exchange with them about the subjects of extremists." (Mahana II village)*

RECOMMENDATION 3: CLARIFY WHAT'S UP IN ZINA?

Efforts should be made to clarify what lies behind the persistently high rate of reports of bandits, criminals and other armed groups across the three rounds, coinciding with the *absence* of reports of the presence of VEOs in R2 and R3. The degree of community concern noted in the qualitative data from Zina with these levels of crime merits closer attention, where references to "nightmare" and "intolerable threats and acts" are made, commonly including the danger of travelling between villages, looting and theft of material goods, food, livestock, rape and torture.

Background for the recommendation:

As seen in Table 10 below, the data set provides an unclear image of development in Zina. Across all three rounds, Zina shows very high level of reports of bandits, criminals (97% in R3) and other armed groups (100% in R3). However, in R2 and R3, respondents do not report VEO presence in Zina. This is significantly down from the 87% level of reports of Boko Haram at R1. At the same time, in R3, 96% of respondents claim that they have "heard about"[3] community support to VEO recruitment, absolutely

[3] Respondents are asked whether they have "heard of" community assistance to VEO recruitment "in their region" rather than "seen it in your village". The latter question would entail that the respondent is willing to incriminate villagers in the same community as the respondent and thus render the question ineffective. The trade-off is that "heard of" opens the

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the highest score, with Kousseri being the next closest recording of 26% in R3 on this parameter. Also, 100% of respondents in R3 in Zina claim that there are "new economic actors".

Table 10: Presence of dominant groups in Zina, all respondents, by Round

		Boko Haram	ISWA (Barnawi)	ISWA (Mamman Nur)	Bandits	Other armed groups	None of the above	Un-known group	Refuse to answer
R1	%	87	0	0	94	99	1	0	0
	Count	60	0	0	65	68	1	0	0
R2	%	0	0	0	100	89	0	0	0
	Count	0	0	0	9	8	0	0	0
R3	%	1	0	0	97	100	3	0	0
	Count	1	0	0	67	69	2	0	0

But, given the noted fall in reports of Boko Haram presence from R1 to R3 in Zina, the data does not immediately enable a clear connection between the high crime rates and the insurgency. It is not clear whether the fall in reported VEO presence results from a sudden community reluctance to report VEO presence in R2 and R3. As noted, respondents reported Boko Haram presence in R1.

The qualitative data does not elaborate on what respondents in Zina concretely mean by community assistance to VEOs and there are no references in the qualitative data to an ethnic or religious dynamic in the alleged community-assistance to VEOs. As seen in the ethnic and religious breakdown of respondents in Zina Arrondissement in the tables below, respondents in Zina are ethnically and religiously heterogeneous. However, based on the dataset, all these communities seem to be equally affected by the high rates of crime. Based on the data set in this influence mapping, it is thus difficult to establish any clear patterns between ethnicity and crime or between religion and crime in Zina.

However, the rumors of community assistance to VEOs and reports of the presence of new economic actors could be a fertile ground for future community conflicts. As seen in other contexts, notably in the recent conflict between Dogon and Fulani in Mali, conflict that follows lines of difference in communities (herder or farmer, religious differences, ethnic differences) can provide an opportunity for the insurgency to expand its reach into Cameroon by allying itself with specific segments of the population. (Boukart Sangaré, "ISS Today: Next steps as violence surges in central Mali", *Institute of Security Studies*, 2nd April 2019).

However, it should be noted that the dataset does not provide evidence that such a development is afoot in Cameroon, and the above comment is thus presented here as a potential risk rather than as a current development.

Similarly, there is no substantive elaboration in the data on "new economic actors" in Zina.

Geographically, the location of Zina at some distance from the VEO-affected arrondissements on the border with Nigeria and buffered by the relatively unaffected arrondissements of Logone Birni, Waza and Pette, suggest that bandits, criminals and other armed groups are not coming from the West.

risk of speculation and hearsay whilst with "in your region", the response becomes difficult to delimit. Nevertheless, the very clear responses to the question in Zina, does suggest a cohesive finding.

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Looking instead to the east of Zina into Chad, the influence mapping conducted by the Consortium during 2018 in Chad was undertaken North of N'Djamena and for this reason is unable to contribute to the question of whether similar activity is seen adjacent to Zina on the Chadian side of the border.

Finally, it should be borne in mind, that the sample size in Zina was 3 villages, amounting to a total of 9 KIs and 60 respondents to the HHS. The population of Zina is 25.572, according to the 2005 census, which has provided the sampling frame for this mapping assignment.

Table 11: Ethnic breakdown of Zina respondents

Ethnicity	Respondent Count
Arab choa	1
Kanembou	2
Kotoko	16
Mandara	2
Massa	4
Mousgoum	37
Guiziga	1
Sarah gambaï	6
Total	**69**

Table 12: Religious breakdown of Zina respondents

Religious affiliation	Respondent Count
Christian	18
Islamic	49
Prefer not to say	2
Total	**69**

On the topic of community relations, at a more general level in the mapping area beyond Zina, there was some evidence in R2 that the role of religion was increasing due to tensions between IDPs and host communities with different religions. Also, limited accounts from some Muslim communities living in multi-denominational areas were reported, who felt obliged to differentiate themselves from Boko Haram in order to demonstrate to other denominations that they harbor no sympathy for Boko Haram. Similarly, there was limited evidence that the importance of religion was increasing as a common identity of victims of VEO violence. However, in R3, these accounts were not sustained, instead being replaced by accounts suggesting that Christian and Muslim faiths were reaching out and mobilizing as vehicles for collective support and cohesion in the face of the social crisis ensuing from the insurgency. In other words, the data does not suggest that there is immediate cause for concern about relations between religious communities in a context where the effects of the insurgency are having negative consequences across religious communities.

Concerning ethnicity, in Bourrha and Mogode arrondissements, there were some allegations of cattle theft levelled at the "bororo" (Fulani ethnicity) in R1 and R3, allegedly crossing the border from Nigeria to conduct raids, but these accounts are limited in number and geographical spread, and as such do not currently indicate a serious threat to ethnic community relations, based on the dataset.

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RECOMMENDATION 4: SUSTAIN "BUSINESS AS USUAL"

With the aim of enhancing community resilience to VEOs, efforts to ensure that communities in VEO affected areas can continue their trade, go to market, move their goods and, in general, do business based on as much freedom of movement as possible, should be emphasized. This includes focusing on community access to their fields, grazing areas, fishing sites and access to water resources. In sum, communities should be assisted as much as possible in maintaining their livelihoods and social networks and in this way enhancing the extent to which life continues "as normal".

Background for the recommendation:

The effect of the insurgency on livelihoods and on "normal life" in the VEO affected areas is one of the topics of community concern which consistently figures in the qualitative material. Communities experience the inability to tend their fields, to graze their livestock and to access their fishing sites as severe interventions in their daily lives. Conducting these activities under the threat of kidnapping, theft, assault and other forms of violence places an extensive burden on communities. The same can be said of movement to nearby villages or markets, both of which are seen as important sites of trade, social interaction and newsgathering.

Maintaining a regular flow of goods and people that is as 'normal' as possible is also a central factor in limiting some of the economic consequences which have been mapped during this influence mapping.

More specifically, three specific economic dynamics (See *SitRep 2, VEO Economic Influence*) resulting from the insurgency have been noted:

- *Firstly,* one of the main points of entry for VEO taxation efforts is provided by the importance to all communities of being able to continue their daily livelihood activities. Here, VEOs are able to give access to fields, fishing sites, grazing areas and other natural resources in exchange for "tax". In other words, the evidence suggests that VEOs either threaten to disrupt, or do disrupt, livelihoods by force until communities agree to pay various kinds of taxes (cash, livestock, material goods, food) to the VEOs. This is a point where communities are really vulnerable.

  A similar argument has been made recently with respect to Nigeria, where an ICG report ("Facing the Challenge of the Islamic State in West Africa Province". International Crisis Group, 2019) claims that efforts to counter the insurgency of ISWA "should take care that in seeking to cut off ISWAP's access to local markets, they (the authorities, ed.) do not alienate locals by also strangling their ability to trade." In the same report, the ICG suggests that in some areas, communities *prefer* the dominance of ISWA to the Nigeria authorities on the grounds that ISWA can ensure the free flow of goods and people and thus the basis for local livelihoods.

- *Secondly,* some economic actors (for example, traders and transport vendors) can benefit economically from either restricted freedom of movement or a reduced number of trading routes. This occurs because prices on transport and goods tend to increase if the freedom or safety of movement decreases, resulting in restricted flow of goods. In other words, the insurgency tends to alter the resource distribution landscape. By this is meant that some actors suffer economic decline (for example, traders on routes no longer accessible) while others are economically strengthened (for example, traders on key, strategic routes which are kept open). Those who are strengthened are those who, before the crisis, were well-placed to

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take advantage of the crisis when it arrived. In the qualitative material, there are accounts of a sense of injustice when some economic actors "are enriched" at the expense of others on account of the insurgency.

- *Thirdly,* refugees and IDPs whose livelihoods have been disrupted or destroyed may be forced to sell their assets at artificially low process in order to generate cash for survival. In some areas, this has caused a supply of unusually cheap assets on the market, which traders have been quick to exploit, buying cheap from IDPs and refugees but selling at higher prices in regional centers like Maroua. Again, this kind of "enrichment" is viewed with some skepticism by respondents.

In sum, efforts to counter the insurgency should be harmonized as much as possible with the livelihood activities of communities to ensure community resilience and ensure continued community support for measures to counter the insurgency. Additionally, to the extent that this is possible, some of the negative economic dynamics of the insurgency associated with skewed resource distribution can be reduced.

RECOMMENDATION 5: FURTHER INVESTIGATE VEO PRACTICES IN NORTHERN LOGONE ET CHARI

There is evidence to suggest that communities might be misidentifying or mislabeling VEOs in the northern parts of Logone et Chari. On the one hand, respondents show near unanimity in identifying the active VEO in northern Logone et Chari as being Boko Haram. On the other hand, the simultaneous inability of respondents to differentiate between VEOs combined with the results of mapping on the Nigerian side of the border which indicates ISWA activity (See *SitRep 2, VEO Differentiation,* in which our work in Nigeria informs this discussion), introduces a degree of doubt about which VEO in fact is operational in northern Logone et Chari. For this reason, the practices of the active VEOs in these areas should be further investigated with the aim of distinguishing which VEOs are operational in which areas. Given the differences in approaches to community engagement shown by Boko Haram and ISWA ("Facing the Challenge of the Islamic State in West Africa Province". International Crisis Group, 2019), the identity of the VEO present in northern Logone et Chari may have implications for the nature of USAID programming in the northern part of Logone et Chari.


A similar ambiguity is not attached to the affected areas in Mayo Sava and Mayo Tsanaga, (immediately east of the Boko Haram strongholds in the Mandara mountains in Nigeria), where sources correspond in identifying the active VEO as Boko Haram.

Background for the recommendation:

One of the surprising findings of the influence mapping has been the stated inability of respondents to differentiate between VEOs. The figures on this parameter are stable across the three rounds, with data from R3 producing the following figure:

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Figure 3: Ability to differentiate between VEOs by Arrondissement



This surprisingly low level of stated differentiation ability occurs despite:

- the ability of respondents to describe Boko Haram in general terms on appearance, mode of influence and propensity for violence. (See *SitRep 2, Distinguishing between Boko Haram, ISWA and Mamman Nur's Group*)
- the willingness of respondents to answer the question about which VEO is present in their area
- numerous references to "Boko Haram" in the qualitative material across the mapping area and the prevalence of the use of the local names for Boko Haram. (See *SitRep 3, Table 4: Common names for VEOs in Focus Arrondissements*)

The following potential causes for this low level of stated differentiation ability have need identified:

- Local communities are afraid to speak specifically about ISWA presence in communities as ISWA is known to intimidate local populations to ensure silence. In other words, respondents are intimidated by ISWA and communities fear retaliatory measures against themselves, family and property.
- The organizational differentiation between Boko Haram, Barnawi's[4] group and Mamman Nur's group is more fluid and undifferentiated at local, village level than macro-level analyses have captured. In other words, the clear differentiation between Boko Haram and ISWA which prevails amongst the leadership in the upper echelons of the two groups and in the analytical accounts of the insurgency in the Lake Chad region does not trickle down as strongly at grass roots level. VEO 'foot soldiers' could be less ideologically motivated and more motivated by opportunism and material gain. In other words, from a decentralized, community level, the

[4] On the reports of the death of Abu Mus'ab Albarnawi and Mamman Nur, see *SitRep 2,* the section on *Alleged leadership change in ISWA*.

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precise VEO affiliation of insurgents is not a primary concern and can change as the relative strength between the VEOs changes.

- The extremely low presence and lack of consolidation of ISWA in the mapping area in Cameroon means that villagers simply are unexposed to ISWA and thus are unable to identify the VEO affiliation of actual insurgents, even though they may have a general image of the differences between VEOs from the media, social media and public discussion in general
- The name Boko Haram is used as a catch-all that includes both ISWA and JAS. (See *SitRep 3 – Terms used for Boko Haram and ISWA*.) This cause is however doubtful as the survey instruments specifically differentiate between Boko Haram, Barnawi and Mamman Nur based on the names of the leader, thus decreasing the potential for confusion based on group name.


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6. ANNEX 1: VEO RESOURCE EXTRACTION MODEL FOR FAR NORTH OF CAMEROON

To supplement the analysis performed in the foregoing report, we have developed a *VEO Resource Extraction Model*, which establishes 4 stages of maturity of VEO resource extraction, depending on the type of resource extraction behavior displayed by VEOs. This model is based on data gathered across the 3 rounds in the Far North of Cameroon.

Using the data gathered for each arrondissement, each arrondissement is placed within one of the 4 stages in *Table 13* below. This enables a geographical targeting strategy to be formulated for each arrondissement, which is sensitive to the stage of the insurgency in the given area.

Figure 4: VEO Resource Extraction Model based on R1 – R3, Far North of Cameroon



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LOGIC OF THE VEO RESOURCE EXTRACTION MODEL

The model is based on a reading of the quantitative and qualitative dataset from R1 through R3 in Cameroon.

The model suggests that the maturity of VEO resource extraction can be gauged in terms of the kinds of behavior displayed by the insurgents. This behavior spans:

- simple *presence* in an area (Stage 1)
- overtly violent *raids* and attacks (Stage 2)
- VEO attempts at *negotiating* the terms of resource extraction (Stage 3)
- the more advanced phenomenon of *habituation*, characterized by regular, consensual interaction between VEOs and communities (Stage 4).

The **assumption** underlying this model is that the methods used by VEOs in the immature phases of resource extraction (violent raids, theft, kidnappings etc.) are too costly for VEOs, they draw too much attention from security forces and additionally are problematic because they alienate communities. These methods might therefore not be sustainable and VEOs thus prefer habituation, if they can establish it.

If this assumption holds, the result is that mature VEO resource extraction will try to establish habitual relations with the community through a process of outreach, recruitment and negotiation with communities. The VEO aim is to allow for regular and sustainable resource extraction from communities.

Importantly, *habituation* (Stage 4) is established by a combination of coercion and consent and does not require the uninterrupted physical presence of VEOs. In other words, maintaining habitual relations with communities does not require that the insurgents have territorial control. It does however require that VEOs can move in the affected areas and can return on a regular basis to consolidate consensual resource extraction practices.

It should be noted, that the use of the term "consensual" in this description does **not** imply community loyalty or ideological support to VEOs. Community consent is presumably imposed by VEOs based on the threat of VEO violence against the community. Similarly, the threat of a regression to the overt violence of the immature insurgency is presumably always present. For this reason, in the absence of sources of government authority which can repel the VEOs, communities might have an interest in conceding to VEO demands. More specifically, communities might prefer to manage VEO demands for resources by integrating them into their livelihood strategies, rather than facing renewed violence that resistance to VEOs would entail.

VEO RESOURCE EXTRACTION STAGE ASSESSMENT FOR ARRONDISSEMENTS

In the table below, each arrondissement is assessed according to the VEO Resource Extraction stage displayed by VEOs in their area, corresponding to the 4 Stages described in the VEO Resource Extraction model above. The analytical basis for making this allocation is provided in *Section 4* above.

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Table 13: Resource extraction stage assessment by arrondissement

Department *Arrondissement*	**Stage Assessment**	**Basic rationale for Stage Assessment**
Logone et Chari		
Blangoua	2	VEO Presence Raids
Darak	4	High incidence of raids, including kidnapping Taxation Policing and law enforcement VEO dispute resolution
Fotokol	2-3	VEO presence Raids Taxation
Goulfey	1	Limited VEO presence with no raids
Hile Alifa	4	High incidence of raids, including kidnapping Taxation VEO dispute resolution
Kousseri	4	VEO presence Policing and law enforcement VEO dispute resolution
Logone Birni	1	Limited VEO presence
Makari	2-3	Low reports of VEO presence but reports of taxation and difficulty of access to Lake Chad
Zina	2	High incidence of raids and presence of bandits and "other" armed groups, but no VEO presence reported (See Recommendation 4)
Mayo Sava		
Kolofata	2	High incidence of raids, including kidnapping, and VEO presence, but no substantial evidence of policing and law enforcement or VEO dispute resolution
Mora	2	VEO presence High incidence of raids, including kidnapping Taxation No substantial evidence of policing and law enforcement or VEO dispute resolution
Tokombere		
Mayo Tsanaga		
Bourrha	2	Comparatively high reports of kidnapping Raids
Koza	1	Presence but limited reports of raids
Mayo Moskota	3	Very high reports of VEO presence accompanied by problems with access to natural resources Taxation Some evidence of VEO dispute resolution
Mogode	2-3	Despite a decline in VEO presence, high incidence of kidnapping reports that VEOs control access to natural resources continue
Mokolo	3	VEO presence Raids Taxation
Diamaré		
Pette	1	Limited presence

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The steps undertaken in this stage assessment can be transformed into a geographical targeting strategy according to the following four steps:

1. Link VEO behavior to the themes and topics of the questionnaires, namely:
    a. "Presence" corresponds to reports of VEO presence
    b. "Raids" corresponds to soft security (including kidnapping), forced taxation, forcible control of access to natural resources, military strength, forced recruitment attempts
    c. "Negotiation" corresponds to *attempts at* consensual taxation and access to natural resources, *attempts at* consensual recruitment, the use of communication channels
    d. "Habituation" corresponds to consensual taxation and access to natural resources, consensual recruitment attempts, the use of communication channels
2. Distribute Arrondissements according to which stage best describes conditions in the area.
3. Depending upon which stage of maturity of the insurgency had been reached in a given arrondissement, a geographical targeting strategy for targeted programming in each Arrondissement can be formulated.

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